KONDA CEO Bekir Ağırdır: NO may succeed

The AKP’s constitutional amendment that seeks to destroy the attainments of Turkey’s 150-year fight for democracy will be submitted to popular vote. In the opposition block, which has lost all of the electoral contests of the past three years apart from 7 June, the troubled state of mind is coupled with the imperative that ‘This time we must succeed.’ Turkey is going to the polls over regime change in the oppressive environment of a state of emergency, with thousands from the opposition, including nearly 150 journalists and MPs, in jail and with society steeped in fear. I spoke to Bekir Ağırdır, CEO of one of Turkey’s leading public opinion research bodies, Konda, about the referendum conditions and the ‘no’ side’s capabiliies and possible strategies.

- What kind of environment are we embarking on the referendum in? Certain polling companies are still showing support for the presidential system to be just in the minority. Is that how you see it? What will swing things in this process?

First, by way of setting the scene, let me say one or two things based on the findings we have to hand. There is a rising expectation of crisis in society. The expectation of an economic crisis. That is, more or less two thirds expect there to be an economic crisis in the immediate short term, in the short space of a few months. So, the upshot is that this is affecting these people’s behaviour in their daily lives. Their expenditure, etc. Secondly, more than half the population consider the prevailing situation to be a political crisis. Thirdly, a significantly large group undoubtedly considers the current issue of terrorism to be the most important issue. Another piece of data is that, when we view things from a social psychological aspect, the number of those who are hopeful about the future has fallen to one-quarter. Another piece of data is society’s perception of the future, that is, if we look at Turkish society in terms of how many years it can see into the future, while the average was eleven two years ago, it has now fallen to ten years. On top of this, two years ago one-quarter were able to see three or less years into the future, that is, they had no idea about the fourth year. This is now one-third of people. So, one-third of 55 million adults are incapable of seeing more than three years into the future. Another piece of data is that what scares people in Turkey most is concern over the future. Another piece of data is that the fear of partition and the opinion that, ‘Foreign powers are interfering in Turkey’s affairs’ are gradually increasing and have risen to more than one-half. When we stack this all up, it shows that Turkish society is currently a society whose nerves are on edge, that is whose concerns and worries have become heightened. When we look at politics just now, both politics (maybe drawing from society a little and also itself manipulating society somewhat) ... I call it a distopian era, that is not utopian, we are in a state in which we express fears over the future. We are embarking on a referendum in such a climate, with such social psychology. This is one side of the affair. In terms of making an analysis based on findings and so as to take a snapshot of society; from the point of view, as it were, of making a blood analysis.  A further matter is, prior to the referendum, I look at what politics is doing and look at what those who bring forward the package and those who oppose the package coming forward say. The arguments and objections involved do not draw on any of society’s real concerns. There are issues such as unemployment and the unjust distribution of income in society’s daily life and there is without doubt terrorism. There is the unease that I have just spoken of in quantitative terms. We are not speaking of a package or objections to it that have their origins in all these figures. In fact, when we look at the one-and-a-half-page justification for the package, there is one justification: stability. When, actually, for fourteen years we have had a ruling party that on each occasion has had 310 and more MPs. So, it is debatable whether our need is for the factor of stability. And the objections, in fact, do not revolve around, ‘Look. Stability is not what we need, but democratisation.’ Quite the reverse, something else is debated. So, this package is not based on arguments or objections that draw on society’s daily life and have their origin in its needs and demands. So, it is divorced from society’s concerns.

- What effect will this have?

Society is not adequately informed about the contents of the package. Not just ours, but other published research confirms more or less the same thing. So, we are embarking on a referendum in such a climate. As to what comes afterwards, that is different. But, at least at the outset, that’s how things stack up.

- Should this state of mind, this edgy - troubled state of mind not normally be channeled towards a party that has been in power for fourteen years and its proposals? But, we found that voting behaviour was different under the influence of the environment of fear in the 1 November elections. Has this edgy state of mind turned into something that nurtures the ruling party?

True. When we look at the difference between 7 June and 1 November, it is possible to say that – let us put it quantitatively – when the AK Party’s 7-8 point increase is examined, 2 points were those coming from the MHP. The most important difference between 7 June and 1 November is that 1 November was perceived of as a second round. This is what we all, the polling companies and the scholarly and intellectual world, overlooked. The affair was regarded as being a second round. Two points were the votes coming from the MHP and two points those from other parties. This did not arise from the changes made by the AK Party to its list of candidates or rhetoric between 7 June and 1 November, or from this and that. Somebody may have been an MHP or Saadet supporter, but they saw it as being a second round, because they knew how things had stacked up on 7 June. A three point difference came from those who did not vote on 7 June but voted for the AK Party on 1 November. So, it appears that there was a segment that was not very close to and not overenamoured with politics but was drawn more strongly towards force due to issues such as terrorist incidents, instability, the inabililty for a government to be formed and the failure for a coalition to be created. As to whether it will play out like this today, I mean this prevailing state of mind or terrorist events becoming more common – I’m not sure about that. But, there is a process in flow both in the world and that is paralleled here. We, of course, just look at our own affairs, but at the same time the whole world, all countries and humanity find themselves on the horns of a ‘freedom or security’ dilemma or a ‘democracy or economic wellbeing’ dilemma. Naturally enough, people, when faced with such choices, if a climate of fear and the politics of fear are in the ascendant, that is, if what informs their expectations, their choices, is not hopes but fears, then they will opt for economic wellbeing or security. This is the way it is in Russia, America and Israel, and how it is here. When we look at wherever there has been an election in the past four years, this is what we keep seeing.

- Why is it like this? I mean, what has happened in the world go make it like this?

The conclusion that I have reached – and let me put the final sentence first – is that I think humanity goes into an ice age from time to time. That is, with humanity having exited the industrial society, we are living - in what we call the information society - lives that are more metropolitan, faster, more complex, more multi-dimensioned, in which information, communication and transport is democratised or liberated, borders dissapear, capital flows with vigour and information and experience flows with vigour. Humanity has not managed to create the governmental and legal system for this new life - you may call it post-modern life, I may call it the information society, somebody else may call it the post-industrial era, but for this new era. Look at it from the aspect of management science or marketing science. Let us look at a number of concepts that have entered our lives in the past twenty years. Unconditional customer satisfaction. Have you ever seen a state that speaks of unconditional citizenship satisfaction? Look at developments in medicine. Right up to microsurgery and who knows what. Is there anybody who is saying let’s set up micro-organisations and let’s conduct micro-surgery in state services or the civil service? No. So, we have not managed to create the governmental and legal systems for this new life. Look at banking today. There is a transaction called forex, for example. Did the making - buying and selling - of futures transactions happen in the banking of industrial society? Products and services used today in banking bear no relation to those of twenty years ago. Twenty years ago we knew about saving and loans and that’s all. Now, there’s another world. But, the law is not compatible with this; the state order is not compatible with this. It has not managed to create models or theories that are the counterpart of this new life in political science, nor has it been possible to create visionary politicians who will adapt these models and theories to politics. However, I sense that the world is waiting for the information society’s Marx, Weber, Keynes and Freud. I think it is waiting for visionary politicians who will advocate new politics rooted in the information that these interpretations yield. On the other hand, not only do we see no such thing happening, but also that this new life - that is, in this new life that is more metropolitan and is more open to intercommunications - creates different problems from the old problems we were familiar with. To compound this, other issues have arisen such as the environment, women’s issues, sustainability and justice and people, unable to sort out this confusion, have not yet managed to create a new vehicle apart from that centralised state that we dislike and criticise. So, an intermediate period has been entered in which the order of the day is ‘let’s bring this business under the control of the old, familliar state again.’ By implication – nobody is taking the chair and saying this, but ... Meanwhile, other dynamics are in play. You see, we said ‘We have returned to a unipolar world’ but we have seen in practice that the USA has neither the capacity, aptitude or intention to this end. Now, Russia is coming back on stage. But, in the previous period there was a world with a discernible Eastern Block; now the spheres of influence are not clear enough to be discernible. We say that ‘Economic power is shifting to the East,’ but all the economic institutions, from the World Bank to the IMF, the principles and rules we are familiar with have come into being to suit the West. One of these balances, the side of things that concerns us greatly, is the Christain world – Muslim world distinction. Nobody wants to come out with it so bluntly, but there is the issue of redefining the relationship between the Muslim world and the remainder and the search for a new balance. Meanwhile, we also went through the business we called the Arab Spring. In the Arab Spring, this move towards an open society in the Muslim world, a peculiar situation has emerged that started from its own internal dynamics (even if there were external factors, starting from its own internal dynamics) in which, if there is no organised opposition, there is a partner on which the opposition has reached agreement and, if there is no utopia, what’s new is chaos. There are so many examples such as 11 September and agitation among immigrants in the Paris slums. So, it has been unable to create new models that will cope with these new problems. It is attempting to breathe fresh life into the old security-focused, centralised, standardised, strong nation state with which it is familiar. It will not be sustainable. That is another matter. Because it is contrary to the nature of things. Because you cannot get this younger generation to accept a life in which the internet is controlled and censored or you cannot return banking to the pre-internet banking period, for example. Even if nation states establish the strictist states ever known to humanity, this will not in fact be sustainable. I think we have entered this kind of intermediate period. So, populist movements of this kind in every country (they are populist because they claim to have come up with the solution to the prevailing injustice) are different from the old right-left that we knew. I mean, what Chavez and Trump say, if you take out certain ideological expressions, boils down to the same thing. To rebel, to make a whole host of promises to groups that have suffered injustice. But, uncoupled from discussion as to whether those promises can be realised, whether they are mathematically possible or whether they are correct. So, the issue is not a right-left issue. I think that humanity is undergoing an all-embracing crisis. Turkey is experiencing both industrial society problems and problems of development and modernisation, and at the same time problems of today’s life, that is globalisation and democratisation. As we are experiencing these four processes at the one time, we have politics and a social structure that is more succeptible to all the crises in the world.

- Following the state of emergency, we have entered a period in which democracy, the constitution and law have been suspended to a considerable extent. The Constitutional Court’s ruling has reinforced this situation because the state of emergency decrees with the force of law cannot be reviewed. Regardless of whether there is a passage to the presidential system, we are aware that this trend will continue. Does this have sustainability? After the state of emergency was proclaimed, optimistic pronouncements were doing the rounds: ‘With us having such intense commercial dealings with the West, we cannot fully dispense with our relations with the EU and, so, the government canot maintain its oppressive policy for long.’ Quite some time has passed, but we have not returned to normal.

This is the story I spoke about a little earlier – we are in this crisis that has to do with the world and has to do with humanity but has components that are peculiar to us. What are they? For one thing, this country has for a century, for 150 years, had a development and modernisation or social transformation problem. When it comes to modelling the nation state and the Republic, there have always been different sets. Consequently, what is going on at the moment on the political stratum here draws its inspiration not only from the world, but there are at the same time issues peculiar to us. This is the crux of the matter when asking whether it is sustainable because we fail to draw lessons from problems and debate a new solution. We are arguing over which of the parties is now victorious, and which party’s system or principles are now valid. Hence, it is not sustainable. What is our basic issue? There was a construction around an indentity along with the Republic – that is, there was the construction of an identity called Turkish; this is a century-long process but there are people, sets, who are outside this identity. In constructing this identity, there are fears and paranoias that ‘The whole world is our enemy.’ When we look at society in Turkey today, there are different sets that have definitions of what is good, correct and nice, that is value sets, and are too large for us to be able to ignore. If you like, look at this as being the pious-secularists, if you like as Turks-Kurds, if you like as progressives-reactionaries and conservatives, look at it however you like. We cannot dismiss any of these sets. Our issue and basic problem is that, having gone through so much experience, rather than devising a new identity and rules for life in a new country in which we can all exist, the identity that objects to the old has usurped power and is endeavouring to devise a new life out of its own identity. This is a repetition of the old error. Formerly, the religious, the pious and political Islamists were on the outside together with the Kurds. Now that they have taken charge they are restructuring the state with reference to themselves with their definitions of what is good, correct and nice. What is our problem? There is a definition of the acceptable citzen for the state. What was that? They will be secular, they will be Muslim, they will be Turkish and they will be Hanafi Sunni. The only thing that has changed now is that they will be pious rather than secular. That is, they will be pious, Turkish, Muslim and Hanafi. The previous version was unsustainable and that is why we have been through all these crises. It is still unstainable now because there are still secularists and Kurds in this country.

- Is secularism not a minimum and necessary component of the social contract? Is it not deficient and incorrect for us to perceive of secularism as being a matter that only relates to secularists and relates to a life style?

True, but essentially two mistakes have been made in this discussion over secularism. To what you said – yes. The issue is that, yes, secularism is one of the rules - one of the indispensible rules - for a society to cohabit, but secularism has two dimensions. One of them is its prohibitive side and the other is its libertarian side. What is its prohibitive side? The ability for science, education and the state, politics and the law to be independent of religion. The libertarian side is the ability of each believer to live as he or she believes. In the previous period, it was not the libertarian side, but the prohibitive side that came to the fore. In the current period, there is talk of resting on the libertarian side while on the other hand mowing down the prohibitive side. Both are thus wrong. We need both together; a redefinition of true secularism. The fundamental problem here is that, prior to making a definition, this issue or notion of secularism was spoken of from a very politicised standpoint. It was turned into an instrument. The simple citizen no longer understands it to mean a religion-state separation or this and that. They perceive it to be the political idea propounded by one wing. Otherwise, secularism is not the problem of Turkish people. All research shows that secularism is not the problem of any life-style set. Where they fundamentally diverge is, for example, over the matter of the attitude towards women.

- Does the attitude towards women not have to do with secularism?

No. The issue of women is an issue that predominantly stems from tradition, even if it partially draws on religious references. The most important issue facing social transformation is the issue of women. When you perceive of this as secularism you are discussing this in a political sense, but when you perceive of this as the issue of women there is the possibility of discussing it from a variety of other perspectives such as practice in daily life or economic standing. So, the problem in Turkey is that in general we engage in politics from within these sets, that is these identities each of which has become politicised, or even polarised, internally. This is Turkish politics’ greatest handicap, including today’s referendum process. Turkish politics has thus gradually become caught up within four sets: Turkist, Kurdist, secularist and pious. Saying secularist, I am knowingly using this so as to exaggerate and also to an extent to characterise; I am not using it to belittle secularism. Each party has become the party of one of these identities. So, we do not speak of the common life, the common good, nice and correct. We speak of the good of each identity being foisted on the others as the best, or the politics of so doing. Whereas our concern is to discuss the notion of how each of us can live within a common life with their own good, correct and nice. If we discuss this, we will also sit secularism in its corect place and will also speak of the correct rules. But, at the moment we cannot speak about such rules. Until 2002 there was coercion from one direction; now, since as I have just said they have usurped the state and this is the mentality within the state, there is coercion from another direction. We are still confronted by the same old state, that is the one that defines the acceptable citizen. We are talking about a centralised state in both cases. In fact, decentralisation is called for in today’s metropolitan, urbanised Turkey.  We are talking of a standardised state. We cannot get the same agricultural engineer to deal with Konya’s drought problem and Rize’s tea problem, but there is a state that looks at everything through centralised eyes. I refer to these examples to explain things to Turks before broaching the Kurdish issue. We are talking of a state order that standardises everything and tries to decide on everything from the centre. In fact, the constitutional package does not stem from our real needs and problems, either. We are talking about politics that says, ‘Let us make today’s definition of this state based on another indentity’ and politics that says, ‘No, let the old definintion of identity stand.’ It is natural for society to be uninterested.

- So, what is society going to base its decision on, then?

If you talk about what dynamics will be decisive in the coming 60-70 days, for one thing, the AK Party machine has not yet come into action in the street over the content. We know the AK Party machine’s and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s power to affect the masses or to manage the perceptual choices of his own base. That machine has yet to come into action. It hasn’t fully come into action. So, at the outset we can say, looking at the snapshot of things today, that both sides are starting out together. From a neck and neck or close to neck and neck position, from a position in which ‘yes’ is a little behind and ‘no’ is a little ahead but they are virtually together. What will swing it? First, the way the AKP machine functions – we don’t know if it will be a machine like prior to 7 June that was nonchalant, broken inside and problematic, or one like prior to 1 November that says, ‘Help, power is slipping from our hands; let’s put aside all the arguments and criticisms among us’ and functions in unison. Second, we know Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s skill and we know the perception of his leadership that holds sway with one-third of the country or society. We know his skill at managing their perceptions and preferences and the relationship he has with them. As to how heavy a presence Erdoğan will mount, how he will manage that process, we don’t know this. Third, as the process unfolds in the coming days we don’t know how economic affairs, the exchange rate, unemployment and manufacturing problems in industry will pan out. Four, we don’t know how the Syrian affair will pan out. I mean, we may not feel Al-Bab in our daily lives in any real way but, at the end of the day, Turkey is at war on one of its edges – our soldiers are actually there. As to how success or failure there, deaths and survivals, will play out on social psychology, or whether there will be such things, we don’t know that. Of course, we don’t know about the terrorism business. Although we do possess one piece of data: Apart from all of these dynamics, when we look at today’s perspective, looking from within this country’s indentities and if we look purely from within political identity, or both cultural identity and political identity, Turkish society is undergoing serious polarisation. This is not new, either. Either as Konda, or myself as Bekir Ağırdır, have had numerous articles and numerous series in Radikal since 2008 and nobody previously took the matter of polarisation seriously. AK Party supporters and even some of our friends said, ‘This is cultural pluralisation – what does it have to do with polarisation?’ Well, we even had this finding to hand and I spoke about it. We have described the visible surface in terms of politcial polarisation being AK Party supporters or opponents. But, there is a step further. I have just mentioned it. Cultural polarisation and politics being squeezed into these four identities. The most serious thing, the phase of this that I call bone cancer, would be for this to turn into life style polarisation. This will lead to ghettoisation and us splitting from one another. This will be its reflection, not just in looking at different newspapers and television stations, but throughout our entire daily lives such as going to different holiday camps, consuming different brands of biscuits and using different courier companies and different banks. In fact, things are headed in this direction in Turkey. There is no relation between political identities and consumption that is known to theory in the world. There is with cultural identity. Muslim’s haram-halal food issue, ... But such a relationship with political identity is not a known relationship in the literature but here, you will recall, there were green capital boycott lists. Don’t forget that the other side has Zionist brand lists or Ergenekon-linked brand lists. For the first time in the USA prior to the presidential elections, the Financial Times published a survey showing a gradual differentiation emerging between even the retail stores visited and brands preferred by Trump and Clinton supporters. Turkey began to experience this earlier. I can say with a degree of pride that we as Konda have been trying to get this across with figures for eight years. More or less two-thirds of Turkish society views the matter through the window of political polarisation. If the referendum process gets mired in this polarisation, the votes of two-thirds of people are known from the outset. If, like during the local elections, things like, ‘Let’s all vote for somebody and keep Kadir Topbaş out’ or ‘For crying out loud, let’s all vote for somebody and keep Melih Gökçek out’ are said, they will keep on winning. This is because when things get polarised political concerns and everything is then forgotten and things are seen from within that identity. They then continue to vote for the one who represents identity out of the fear that what they will lose will not just be the loss of power but of losing all that they have gained and their own identity. So, and this is the second layer, the squeezing into four identities. The third is this life style squeezing. We can say that the preferences of more or less 36 million of the 55 million voters (we do not know the final figures and overseas voters are not included) are known. Of the remaining 16 million, some will vote and as to which direction they will veer in and how they will be affected by the four or five dynamics I have listed above - this is uncertain.

- When accounting for what will affect the referendum result, this is a very significant thing, you did not list the opposition’s campaign.

True.

- Do you hold out no hope for this?

That’s a different matter. My thesis is that, for one thing, this system of governance, this centralised system, in Turkey – I am not referring to the proposals on the table - what is in existence is unsustainable in any case. I mean, I do not stand in favour of defending the old in the face of the proposed package. We need to set up something new but what is proposed is not the new thing that needs to be set up. My position is clear in my mind. I believe that society is also thinking about this with sincerity. Turkish society is uncomfortable with the existing system of governance but as to whether it it will come to the perception that the thing touted as change ‘is a move in the correct direction,’ as at the time of the 12 September referendum, or ‘will be worse than the old,’ I cannot say anything about that today. The opposition is in disarray. In the face of the AK Party’s overwhelming dominance in politics, those having secular identity, those who have secular life styles, have been incapable of producing new politics because they are unaware of the need for a conceptual transformation. As they do not create a demand through acting on such a need, the CHP doesn’t change, either. We keep on saying, ‘The CHP doesn’t change,’ we blame the party and look to the leader, but, on the other hand, the mases are not pressurising the CHP, either, and calling for change.

- The HDP presented the prospect of being different in these terms.

The HDP’s project of non-ethnic Turkishness was of significance in this regard, but this suited neither the PKK nor the AK Party. The statements emanating from an honest-to-goodness leader like Selahattin Demirtaş. This is another matter, but there are large masses today whom we could call the opposition wing that will come out in favour of ‘no’. Those with demands, those in need of hope and those in need of a utopia. As to whether the CHP will be capable of leading this, we don’t know. But this is the crux of the matter, in my view. This time it isn’t possible to say that such an easy ‘yes’, such a certain ‘yes’, will emerge. I think it has started out at fifty-fifty. If those in opposition set out to society what is needed in its place, rather than a categorical position of opposition, and can engender confidence in society as to how this is to be done, it has a chance of success. However, they first need the self-confidence that has them saying, ‘We must succeed; we can succeed.’

- Is this possible after having lost all referendums and elections?

This is a two-stage process. There is a referendum. If ‘yes’ emerges from the referendum, there is a presidential election under these powers. So, if those who are going to say ‘no’ or those who oppose this package form a two-stage strategy, if they form one separately for the referendum and one separately for the presidency regardless of what emerges from the referendum, and if this time they can get themselves to feel, ‘We can succeed,’ they may succeed. The problem is that there is no leadership heading them. We are talking about Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and we are talking about the AK Party machine, but there are no two such components here.

- Disputes over the Kurdish issue split the opposition and detract from unity of discourse.

True. This is a protracted affair, but there is an opinion among a section of the public that following all these events and having seen what the PKK did, the HDP’s vote collapsed and the votes returned to the AK Party. This is because there are no political actors apart from the AK Party and HDP. Our observation is the pro-HDP Kurds have their qualms and are angry with the PKK, but this doesn’t mean they have returned to the AK Party. They still stand by the HDP.

- So, this is a bit like criticism within the community, you mean?

Yes. Both that, and they have a century’s experience. We hear, ‘Why didn’t they come out when Selahattin Demirtaş was detained?’ or ‘Look at the trenches – they didn’t support them.’  Yes, they didn’t support the trenches because they weren’t convinced. They didn’t come out into the streets when Selahattin Demirtaş was detained because they have a century’s experience and knew what would befall them if they came out into the street for Demirtaş. This does not mean that they displayed no reaction. The Kurds who will vote for the HDP will all say ‘no’ together as a block. No question about it.

- If there were to be an election today, would the HDP clear the threshold?

At the moment, of course, they are on the borderline. The MHP is actually as much on the borderline as the HDP, as far as clearing or falling short of the threshold goes. I cannot say they are for sure below the threshold just now. This is not what I see, quite frankly. But, they are running the risk of this.

There are those who say that the HDP, despite all the pressure, engages in non-conflict-provoking and common sense disourse. Can this have an impact?

Yes, indeed, most certainly. There are various things there. The HDP’s discourse still involves keeping its cool, the effort to do so, the effort to make cool-headed pronouncements, on the one hand. Then, the inspiration for somebody voting HDP does not have to do with abandoning religion, but with voting for a Kurdish party. There is no easy departure from that position – that position was not reached easily and there is no easy return from there, either. So, the reason for the drop in the HDP’s vote on 1 November compared to 7 June was not that those votes returned to the AK Party. This isn’t why the HDP’s vote fell. Two points that vote for the HDP didn’t go to the ballot box. It is not that they went to the ballot box and voted for the AK Party. We have analyses of the vote per ballot box. An 8-9 point block will go to the polls and vote ‘no’. The issue here is the lack of hope, the lack of a utopia in front of the opposition block. Actually, there is no utopia before Turkish society. So, fear of fear becomes approval. My thesis is that, if in the period up until the referendum the campaigns on both the AK Party wing and the CHP wing are waged solely in terms of fear and scaring, when it comes to the forces having the capacity to scare, the AK Party is stronger in this respect – it possesses state power. But, if, instead of this, the opposition can make this about hope and can make this about a utopia, and can form a strategy encompassing the presidential election, it has a chance of success. We will see whether or not it manages this. I also observe a dyanamic here – you know, those secular circles, the circles having a secular life style, they do not have to be without fail CHP or HDP supporters, the circles whose life style is secular – all the feelings of hopelessness following the defeats in all elections and referendums over twelve years and especially following 1 November, what I see is that these are now abating and undergoing reversal, because they were at rock bottom. Now, everybody is filled with the endeavour ‘Given that I, too, am in this country, I must be more active and effective for this country.’ So, if all these endeavours transform into the correct energy and strategy, then there is a possiblity of ‘no’ emerging from the referendum, you know.

- There is a lot of debate over us embarking on a referendum under state of emergency conditions. Indeed, the Prime-Minister initially even said, ‘We will not let them say that they held an election under state of emergency conditions,’ but they have opted to hold the referendum under state of emergency conditions. Is this a sign that the government will increase its oppressive policies up until the referendum?

- There is a lot of debate over us embarking on a referendum under state of emergency conditions. Indeed, the Prime-Minister initially even said, ‘We will not let them say that they held an election under state of emergency conditions,’ but they have opted to hold the referendum under state of emergency conditions. Is this a sign that the government will increase its oppressive policies up until the referendum?

They will not lift the state of emergency. I think the reason for all this rush in parliament was for the referendum to be held under a state of emergency. They wanted to hold it at the beginning of April. If ‘yes’ emerges from the referendum, they will be able to say that they have lifted the state of emergency the following week with no need for a vote. This may also have been done as a tactical plan to say, ‘This will relieve the country psychologically.’

- Will a referendum under state of emergency conditions confer a great advantage on the ruling party?

Undoubtedly, because if you say that even for every tweet on social media you will chase up and prosecute the guy and propose to detain a teacher for his criticism just because a student recorded it, the psychological climate this will create is the climate of, ‘Say little, don’t get too involved.’ So, of course, this will favour the ruling party.