İdris Baluken: No boycott from HDP voters

The HDP has become one of the most important political actors of recent political history. Its success in the 7 June elections and the positive image that it created among all sections of society came as a huge leap forward for this umbrella organisation that encompasses Kurdish politics and the left. In the period of conflict, the image that the HDP had created took quite a knock. In operations conducted by the judiciary in parallel with the ruling circle’s goals, thousands of HDP people have been remanded in custody, including the co-chairs and ten members of parliament. Thanks to the referendum, fresh interest is being shown in the HDP, which had been silenced through heavy media censorship. This time, despite having come out in favour of ‘No,’ a significant portion of its voters allegedly favour a boycott. I discussed all these things with HDP Group Vice Chair İdris Baluken, who was released from prison last week, in his room at parliament.

- On leaving prison, you spoke of strict solitary confinement and prison conditions not being good. What were the conditions – can you talk about them?

Before entering the prison, the treatment we were subjected to on the journey from Ankara to Kandıra amounted to kidnapping in the full sense. We were taken from here by plane to Diyarbakır Airport. At Diyarbakır Airport, two of those notorious Ranger cars picked us up and no reply was given to any of the questions I asked. They were civilian cars furnished with guns. They didn’t even answer questions about where we were going. Then, we went to a place on the Diyarbakır – Bingöl highway where two helicopters were waiting. I asked where we were going while getting into the helicopters and was unable to get a reply again. I saw people on duty in snow masks among them. We were then held in a cold and dark cell at Bingöl Anti-Terrorism Branch. There was a two-roomed place with a dividing partition there. ISIL members had been put next door. Over these entire processes and afterwards when the remand order had been passed, the people on duty there kept on saying so that I would hear, ‘We are releasing the ISIL members.’

- Were there any insults or other mistreatment?

There was no direct beating or insulting, but there was the absence of any reply to questions about where we were going that I have spoken of. The withholding of all information when we were being taken from the Ranger pick-ups to the helicopters and again by plane from Bingöl Airport to Kandıra was a kind of mistreatment. You have no idea where you’re going at that time. If a member of parliament is arrested and remanded in this manner in the 21st century, things are indeed very serious. Once you get to Kandıra Prison, you do not hear a single voice at all for 24 hours. There is no television or newspapers. There is no input as to what is going on in the external world. Once certain things had been dealt with - of course, I also raised issues - certain shortcomings were put right. However, despite our applications, I stayed in a single cell for three months. In a classic F-type cell, more correctly, a cell that defies classification – an F unclassifiable cell. You stay alone in a three-person cell. There is a courtyard onto which it opens immediately. There are both your MP colleagues and mayor colleagues in the same prison. No positive reply at all was received to requests I made to stay together with them. In the course of three months, I was only able to speak three times to Fırat Anlı and Mehmet Ali Bul. Once alone, and once to both of them together. Apart from that, I didn’t speak to anybody in prison for three months.

- That means you were subjected to what we call solitary confinement. How did solitary confinement affect you?

For one thing, I am of the view that this is a most particular concept. The World Health Organisation defines a person being in a healthy state as: ‘The state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being.’ Under solitary confinement, you are under heavy attack in these three areas. You feel this every day. Under those conditions, it is impossible to maintain your holistic health. You need to read as much as possible. I tried to read a great deal. You need to be in a state of motion over the day. Otherwise, the moment you remain motionless, you immediately feel the whole cell fill of its own accord with a sense of pessimism, hopelessness and depression in physical and psychological terms. So, you spend your days walking, moving and reading.

- Were you able to get books and newspapers?

Yes, they were provided once certain things had been dealt with. There are certain channels on the television. I imagine they’re channels that were selected under a survey within the prison. We could watch about twenty channels. Of course, I conveyed my request for parliamentary television from the outset. No reply was forthcoming to my request for a long time. You see, I wanted to follow the 2017 budget debates on parliamentary television. At the same time, I was Group Vice Chair when I was admitted. So, there were various obstructions to that. I also informed my MP colleagues through the lawyers and asked them to take a special interest in this matter and get arrangements in place to watch parliamentary television. I think that on the third or fourth day of the budget an arrangement was made for parliamentary television. Then I was deprived of it again. I was particularly curious about the sessions dealing with the constitutional amendment but there was no parliamentary television for a long time over that period. When I got the message back out to the colleagues, parliamentary television broadcasts kicked in towards the end but, since over the course of the constitutional amendment broadcasts went on until seven in the evening and that time the group proposals submitted by the groups were for the most part being debated, I was not even able to follow the debate over the constitutional amendment. As an MP, I was deprived of both my say and my vote during the constitutional amendment debate. As a Diyarbakır MP, when my name was read I should have been provided with the necessary means to perform my statutorily guaranteed duty to legislate. Not only was this not done, but I was even prevented from watching the debate in my cell.

- You wrote letters to parliament about getting a vote. Were they replied to?

No, there was no written reply. On this point, the political institution passes the buck to the judiciary. It says, ‘This is a judicial decision.’ Not that there is any such decision in the judicial sphere that stands in the way of our duty to legislate, either. I mean, unlawful as it is, a remand order was passed, but there was no order saying, ‘He cannot vote’ or ‘His duty to legislate is impeded.’ Were there to be such a decision, this in any case would amount to the full elimination of the separation of powers, which is actually being mooted, and interference by the judiciary with the legislature.

- Did any message come from ruling circles at this time? Or from parliament or other parties?

No. A group of MPs from the CHP came to visit me. Group Vice Chair Özgür Özel, Veli Ağbaba from the Prison Commission and Tahsin Tarhan came to visit me. When they came, they said that a few people in the AKP felt sad about my situation, the situation relating to me, and conveyed their greetings and they even passed on greetings from some MPs from the MHP. They only permitted our MPs to visit once. Pervin Buldan and Mithat Sancar visited once. Apart from that, apart from the greetings coming via the CHP MPs, no special messages came.

- Parliament isn’t standing up for the remanded MPs, is it?

Prime responsibility in this regard rests with the Parliamentary Speaker’s Office. The Speaker of Parliament cannot afford to remain aloof like this over the duty to legislate that is under constitutional and statutory guarantee being impeded. It is not on. In past periods, with regard to MPs who had been elected as deputies while in prison but remained on remand, Cemil Çiçek, who was parliamentary speaker at the time, used to say at nearly every Consultancy Committee meeting, ‘We must do something about this. Do what you can as groups to speed things up. I am also unhappy.’ Within this sequence of events, I have not heard a single pronouncement by the speaker of parliament about MPs who, far from having been imprisoned and elected as deputies, had been elected as deputies and were remanded while performing their legislative duties in parliament. I mean, could a written statement not have been made following this operation? Could an appearance not have been made before the cameras and a few sentences be spoken devoted to the relationship between the prevailing situation and the duty to legislate?

- If so, what comes to mind is Selahattin Demirtaş having said, ‘Our remanding was not a judicial decision – it was a decision that people in the AKP came together and took. It was decided at this meeting when and how we would be apprehended.’ Do you have information about this meeting?

I have no direct information about this meeting. But, I would especially like to paint a description for everybody of the evening we were detained. It was as though prosecutors in five to six different provinces and in connection with different files and totally unrelated cases pressed the button at the same hour or even at the same minute and they staged an operation involving swoops on MPs’ homes. There is no such mechanism within Turkey’s existing judicial system. We are talking about a situation calling for coordination and synchronisation in connection with files in five or six provinces. Now, if such a mechanism does not exist within judicial processes, this in itself confirms that this was a political operation. We have always said that judicial institutions are under political pressure. In fact, this state of affairs has exposed this operation, conducted as it was under political pressure and for political motives, to the whole of Turkey and world public opinion. But, the basic handicap here is that people were caught up in an atmosphere in which they were afraid to mention the word ‘HDP’ or the HDP MPs. When I spent hours watching discussions on the TV screens and followed opinion pieces in newspapers, I saw with horror how an issue whose lawlessness was crying out to be exposed was by-passed and how it was ignored.

- The media turned a blind eye out of the pressure placed on it, but there were no mass protests either in cities where HDP voters are concentrated. There was no great groundswell of support, either.

Look, this is a perception that has been very consciously created. If the conditions had existed that would have permitted people to freely express themselves and freely congregate, had there existed an environment in which the necessary democratic preconditions for this were in place, and the mass reactions you spoke of had not come about, then I would be able to agree with that opinion. But, can we speak about such an environment today? In these times of curfew and blockade, this is the state of affairs this atmosphere of fear has produced, created using everything from burning bodies to the state of emergency conditions. Think just of the prevailing state of emergency conditions. You can be arrested and remain under arrest for thirty days without any legal grounds. You can be remanded in custody until some uncertain future date. They can terminate your employment. A process is put in place that will cause your entire family to suffer. With them able to do this at the level of MPs and a party’s co-chairs, the message is also given to society, ‘If we can do this to co-chairs and MPs, you, too, will also take stock of these conditions and act accordingly.’ We were also in Diyarbakır for a week when the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality co-mayors were arrested and remanded. I together with my colleagues, most notably Selahattin Demirtaş, went virtually from street to street and house to house and organised efforts. We observed from close up how the people’s outrage, fury and inability to accept this affair had accumulated in their hearts. We witnessed this from close up. However, when the next day we decided to make a press statement somewhere, the places where that press statement took place were fully blockaded. Everybody who attended was filmed. Then, based on that footage, many people faced the music under state of emergency conditions. With all of this going on in the background, it flies in the face of fairness and common sense to make comments such as ‘The people of the region showed no reaction and did not come out into the street.’ Let democratic and free conditions prevail today and let meetings not be broken up under state of emergency conditions if five people congregate, and see how people react to Selahattin Demirtaş being inside. Or the other MPs and other co-chairs.

- Two MPs were remanded on the day you were released. First your release was ordered and this was perceived as being a relaxation, but two remand orders came immediately afterwards.

In fact, I felt really gutted when I was released. If there was a little joy, I also walked out feeling really gutted. At the end of the day, the co-chairs and my colleagues are inside. I mean, hundreds of journalists and thousands of innocent people are inside. Many of our colleagues, our mayors, are inside. Under such circumstances, you want to think, ‘I hope my getting out will lead to certain things,’ but when I saw the developments that took place straight away in a few hours, even one hour’s joy appeared to have been overdone. It’s overdone as far as society is concerned. I mean, I think certain boundaries are being imposed on circles that wish to breathe, do not wish to lose hope over certain things in this country and wish to foster optimism with that hope. The message that it is wished to convey is: ‘You can have hope within the boundaries we set. Your perception of the future can be restricted to within these bounds.’

- So, the wish is even to prevent an optimistic atmosphere from arising?

If even a little joy leaves you choking, this really is a grim state of affairs. I mean, the remanding of two MPs on the same day as I got out is actually a message directed at Kurds and all the various identities and various segments who vote for the HDP in Turkey. The message: ‘Don’t go thinking that we have dispensed with the ongoing process of oppression. We are operating that process as before.’

- In keeping with your release order, Demirtaş should actually also be released, because the court cited the Constitutional Court’s Mustafa Balbay ruling in releasing you. In that ruling, the Constitutional Court considers the unjust detention of an MP to be a violation of the MP’s right to stand for election and also of the right to vote of the voters who voted for him.

Mr Göktaş, our situation is not an ordinary situation. As I have stated, it is treated in a way that makes it seem normal because of the prevailing recriminatory environment and attitude of the media. However, we are encountering a historic state of affairs that will be debated for decades, over the course of the century, with reference to democracy. Look, the continued absence of a Constitutional Court ruling regarding this situation, its failure to deal with this matter yet, is shameful. It has a precedent ruling to hand. Even if all state institutions, the political institution and the entire social fabric acts as if this were normal, the Constitutional Court as the institution serving as the supreme legal body cannot approach this as if it were normal. It should by now have deliberated numerous times on the situation regarding the MPs and have ruled on this, either positively or negatively. And in this matter, the situation of our MPs who were released on the basis of the Balbay ruling and the Haberal ruling was obvious, anyway. I mean, three months have gone by and the Constitutional Court has yet to start deliberating on this matter. Nor is it really an acceptable situation for the European Court of Human Rights to treat the prevailing lawlessness as ‘exhausting domestic remedies.’ Yes, such a prescription may have been made in terms of mechanism, but what is to happen if, say, the Constitutional Court does not pass a decision in the course of a year? Is the European Court of Human Rights to remain a passive observer in this case? The duty to legislate will have been impeded.

- So, the granting of the right of individual application to the Constitutional Court blocks the European Court of Human Rights from making a ruling. The aim has been turned on its head.

Look, unless certain matters, certain sensitivities, are taken into account there, you eliminate the sense of justice. This is germane just now to the situation of the remanded MPs and the remanded journalists. The Constitutional Court cannot afford to stretch out the process concerning the remanded MPs and the remanded journalists. It should not do so. Public opinion must be brought to bear here, too. If we are still to speak of the rule of law, jurists, bar association and people of all walks must pay very close attention to the process involved. The situation of Cumhuriyet newspaper’s columnists is perfectly clear. There is still no sign of an indictment, but tens of journalists have been inside for months. You’ll recall that the Constitutional Court passed a ruling over Can Dündar and Erdem Gül in two months. Well, what’s different now? What are you waiting for?

- Do you consider the CHP’s attitude with regard to the remanded MPs to be adequate?

One of the political structures that bears the greatest responsibility for this state of affairs is the CHP. I have to get this across. When the issue of immunity came on the agenda, we stated clearly what this portended, the grave consequences it would lead to, the manner in which it would rob parliament of its dignity and how essentially the will of MPs would be taken hostage, and how our MPs would be taken to jail instead of parliament. We also stated this in our one-on-one discussions. You will recall how at that time they said as the main opposition party, ‘It is in breach of the constitution but we will say “Yes”.’ Now, if you say that, i.e. you acquiesce in some way to the constitution being breached, the existing ruling party will go out and do that every day drawing on all the means available to it. The CHP has an institutional responsibility here that derives from its institutional position. Of course, within the CHP there are valuable left-wing, social democratic and socialist people who know about the Alevi and Kurdish struggle and come from that tradition. I don’t want to categorically classify them in this way, but, in institutional terms, that position gave rise to the CHP’s historic responsibility. There is a hesitation that derives from this. That’s the first thing. Secondly, in particular following the 15 July coup attempt, the CHP did not put forward a clear position in response to Erdoğan and the AKP’s attitude that rejected the HDP and sidelined all of the diversity in Turkey that is embodied by the HDP in the process of reconstructing the state. Instead of a position in support of democracy, it was the supporter of the nationalistic approach and the nationalistic construction approach formulated as the Yenikapı spirit. They accepted those positions. I imagine that there - in discussions held at that time - I think that these kinds of processes were also spoken of and when processes of this nature with reference to the HDP were also mooted, a consensus was likely reached that this needed to be handled from a nationalistic perspective and with national sensitivities. This is how it looks in terms of those who set the CHP’s institutional policies. I mean, I found this to be reprehensible when I saw this on television. The leader of the main opposition party did not stand up for the rights vested in us of the voters who voted for us while the central budget debates were held. Leave us to one side, you may not particularly be able to bring yourself to perhaps mention İdris Baluken and Selahattin Demirtaş, you may hesitate or not see it as being necessary, but you must defend the rights of the voters whose rights to vet the budget that are vested in us have been frustrated. You are the main opposition party. In the same way, you are obliged defend that block of voters’ rights and entitlements during the constitutional amendment debates, because the main opposition party does not only look out for the rights of those who vote for it, but is duty bound to monitor the injustices faced by all circles in Turkey that are in opposition and are harmed by the rulership’s policies in some way, and to scrutinise the rulership within the constitutional framework. I watched almost all of the television programmes on which it appeared. For example, when speaking of remand, when I saw it speak of the remanded journalists and not mentioning Selahattin Demirtaş’s name and the manner in which it speedily passed over the remanded MPs, I felt great sorrow. And I found this reprehensible. This was a very disgraceful thing. After all, you are speaking from that lectern during debate on the planned budget or during constitutional change, and you must devote a sentence or two to the need for Selahattin Demirtaş or Figen Yüksekdağ to speak from there. Look, there is an interesting situation. I was the person who signed the joint declaration following the 15 July coup on behalf of the party. My signature is beneath that declaration. That declaration is mentioned when analysis and comments are made about the 15 July coup attempt, but they are incapable of formulating the sentence: ‘What business does an MP whose signature is beneath that declaration have in jail?’ Now, you can in a way understand the AKP not doing this or those close to the AKP not doing this, but the CHP should not be able to indulge in such a position. I mean, if you are incapable of describing the imprisonment, rather than his being in parliament, of an MP whose signature appears on the four-party declaration as a coup, your sincerity over this comes into question. I am thus of the opinion that stances of this nature have unfortunately visited very grave consequences on Turkey. The CHP has to move beyond this. The CHP’s basic issue is whether it is to be a status quoist state party or a mass popular party. It finds itself on a threshold where it must finally decide on this. The expectation of the CHP from wide circles, wide social circles, is for it be a left, social democratic, socialist in terms of universal values, popular party. But the CHP has unfortunately persisted in continuing to opt for a status quoist institutional position throughout the final decision making processes. We have seen this in all areas in which it has to make critical final decisions, for example in voting on immunity, on the war resolution and in the sequences of events relating to our remanding.

- You as a party are saying ‘No’ in the referendum, but in the polls there appears to be a noticeable tendency in the direction of a boycott among your voters. We are starting to hear this spoken of as being in the region of 20-30 percent. What do you attribute this to?

I have been in prison for three months and have just got out. To enable me to answer this question I need to take the pulse in the field and find out directly what people’s views are. But, from what I have gathered, our people do not feel there has been adequate discussion over the legitimacy of the referendum. The efforts that the HDP has made to this end have not received sufficient attention due to heavy press censorship. Let us think about things from our point of view. Our two co-chairs and ten of our MP colleagues are in jail. Two have just been released. More than fifty of our mayors are in jail. Curators have been appointed to all our municipalities. The vast majority of our province and sub-province administrators are in jail. Under such circumstances, you cannot speak of conditions that will enable us to campaign in the referendum. The referendum also lacks legitimacy for as long as those colleagues are inside. In spite of this, the HDP has a position that it has adopted with great responsibility taking account of Turkish democracy, our social peace and our peoples’ joint future. Not much debate was conducted over legitimacy with censorship weighing so heavily. There seems to an opinion that there needs to be more of this debate over legitimacy.

- An HDP voter I have spoken to says, ‘I have lived through both the 90’s and the 2010’s. We were subjected to great oppression in both. The language of those conducting the ‘No’ campaign doesn’t speak to me. Sometimes I find myself tempted to say let them stew in their own juice. It appears to be an issue external to us. That’s how the ‘No’ people see it, too. They ignore what’s done to us. So, I’m going to vote ‘No,’ but not with enthusiasm; I will vote ‘No’ to do my duty.’ Voters in Diyarbakır, Cizre and the destroyed towns may feel this a bit more strongly. Are you thinking of doing anything to counter this? Because, such a trend among voters will greatly benefit ‘Yes’.

Look, actually we are undergoing a process in which, when it comes to Turkey’s democracy, minds are closed over the degree to which the HDP has a key role and serves as safety valve in terms of Turkey’s future, and prejudices are given free rein. I watched the discussions with amazement while I was inside. I mean, had the HDP in its current positon not come out in support of ‘No,’ all of those who have concerns over Turkish democracy need to review what the consequences would have been. What would have happened? Would there have been circumstances conducive to contemplating the future with any kind of hope? This would have been impossible. Under these circumstances, rather than the emergence of a readiness to make sense of the HDP’s current position and to attach credence to it, there still exists a constant reluctance even to be mentioned in the same sentence as the HDP. With the added existence of things that inspire fear, discrediting and intimidation, these are naturally enough capable of arousing such feelings among HDP voters. Look, in the same way, and I say this independently of the AKP administration and President, let those who are going to vote ‘Yes’ also take stock of the HDP’s current position. Had the HDP not come out with a position on the referendum today and, regardless of what the actual result is when the referendum result is known, had there been a serious boycott tomorrow in places where the Kurdish population is concentrated, this may have sparked of various discussions in the context of world politics and the Middle Eastern equation. I am thus of the opinion that both those who vote ‘Yes’ and those who vote ‘No’ must take stock of just how sensitively the HDP acted with regard to the country’s integrity and democratic future and just how historically important its position in this regard was.

- Are you going to wage an intense ‘No’ campaign, especially a ‘No’ campaign aimed at your voters who are tending towards boycott?

I need to start by stressing that in all elections until now, from among voters in Turkey, it has been HDP voters who have been the best organised and have displayed the most political attitude. Bear in mind that when we stood as independents we managed to attain a degree of organisation based on calculations of miniscule swings in the vote that we made beforehand in places where even ten votes could determine the result. This is our form. So, I do not greatly imagine that, following the position put forward by the party’s authorised committees and authorised organs, our voters will adopt a different attitude. I mean, even if we look at the electoral experiences we have had recently, it is not very realistic to imagine that after the HDP has set out its ‘No’ position and has taken part in the ‘No’ campaign the HDP electorate will stage a boycott.

- So, you do not agree with interpretations that, following the trenches, intense urban conflict and the destruction of towns, the electorate accuses and bears a grudge towards the HDP to an extent?

It is impossible for me to agree with this, Mr Göktaş. This is a very conscious distortion. The HDP never had a position that tolerated, defended or was indifferent towards the process that played out there along with the trenches. This is information that has been distorted in a very conscious manner by the AKP and its poodle media and presented to Turkish society to criminalise the HDP.  When the trenches were first dug, we organised a regional tour with our co-chairs at the time and 10-15 MPs. In the course of this tour, Selahattin Demirtaş passed on very clear messages. Very clear messages were given that in the new period we could solve all our problems through democratic politics, there was no need at all for endeavours involving different methods, and the HDP had the political determination to enable it to pursue all demands in the arena of democratic politics. As if none of this had happened, in order to criminalise the HDP the attempt is made to create an image in which it was supposedly the HDP that dug the trenches, made the people suffer and was part of all of that destruction. From the very outset, the HDP did all in its power to prevent that armed conflict around the trenches that was brought to public attention in Turkey from dominating the agenda. It devoted all its energy to that.

- With the benefit of hindsight, do you criticise the organisation that dug the trenches in towns and opted for such a method?

In terms of the HDP’s position, I have to say that, after this de-facto situation came into being, the HDP devoted all of its energy to removing the problem from the field of conflict and strove to turn it into a field of dialogue, a field of politics.

- OK, in doing that, did you turn to the PKK and say, ‘You are making a mistake?’

Look, in that period, the leaders in Qandil were issuing statements about the HDP’s comments. They were also criticising. They were harshly criticising the HDP’s position. But, the AKP’s scribes and those conducting its propaganda ignored these efforts on the part of the HDP and created the impression within Turkish society that the cause of the problems was the HDP. In announcements made from Qandil at that time, there were also certain very harsh criticisms concerning the comments made by the HDP about its regional tour. I particularly wish to stress that trenches were also a problem before the events in the most recent Sur, Cizre and Silopi affair. You will recall that when there were similar problems six months ago and one year ago in Lice and Cizre we also desired to take the initiative and solve the problem just as in the period most recently witnessed and at that time, since the channels of dialogue were open, we solved many problems without experiencing loss of life and without civilian areas being destroyed. But, in the most recent period, there was a quite conscious wish for the channels of dialogue not to be opened. A block was consciously placed in the way of moving the problem into the field of democratic politics and the desire for the correct thing to be done from here, and things went downhill from there.

- It is stated that certain public officials paid no heed to the wish of civil society on account of their being FETO members, and certain events could not be hindered even though the president got involved, especially in the cellars in Cizre. Do you see FETO as having had involvement here? Or can they be held to account?

I don’t know if it was FETO or another formation, but I have said on countless occasions from the parliamentary lectern that I did not personally witness a situation in Ankara where it was unable to impose its command on the structure in Cizre. For example, we held discussions with government officials at midnight about the cellars in Cizre. It was stated to us that the prime-minister at the time, Davutoğlu, had taken charge of the event and transfers to hospital of the civilians who were waiting in an injured state in the cellars would be undertaken the next day. In that process, we tried to steer things together by sitting in person alongside senior officials of the Interior Ministry. However, instructions emanating from here were totally disregarded by the local counterparts there and those terrible scenes of massacre played out. The problem was that, after those deaths had taken place in the cellars, the political decision makers here stood behind all those deaths. That is, rather than a course of action that shunned what had been done there, undertook investigation procedures into them and subjected them to the legal proceedings incumbent on the state that inquired, ‘Why did you not obey the instructions from here?’ an attitude of condonement emerged and the problem took on dimensions from here. The political decision makers stood by it, regardless of whether or not FETO did it. How many times did we submit investigation proposals in parliament? If nothing was being done within the government, we said, come on, let MPs from the four political parties to go together, examine the event on-site, and inform parliament and public opinion after having compiled a report. But those who blocked this vindicated through their actions the events there. Then what happened? It has emerged that most of those who steered these events played a part in the 15 July coup attempt. In other works, had action actually been taken over the situation in Cizre and the situation in Silopi on that day, you would not have seen those scenes on 15 July that you saw on the Bosphorous Bridge, that you saw on the streets of Ankara, that you saw in Istanbul. In this regard, I have witnessed first hand some AKP members whom I have spoken to face to face making the pronouncement, ‘We made a mistake at that time; we attached no importance to what you said and we defended everything that had happened there with our ears blocked to what you were saying, and that’s why these events came to pass.’

- I have frequently heard from analysists of various opinions whom I have interviewed that, on the morning of 7 June, the HDP getting 13% of the vote disturbed not only the AKP, but the PKK, because with the former widening its polical sphere the latter’s was being narrowed.

I have no idea about that. To comment on that, I would have to have spoken to officials at Qandil during that period. Since I didn’t have the opportunity to do so, I have no way of knowing what they were thinking. But, I can say that we thought - especially after the 7 June elections - we had pulled off a result strong enough to solve all of Turkey’s problems through taking initiative as far as possible in the sphere of democratic politics, and we loudly stated on countless occasions to the public that, come what may, conflict should not dominate the agenda in Turkey.

- Did the PKK not listen to you, then?

When we ask them, they list quite a few reasons, from the bombing of the Diyarbakır rally on 5 June to the Suruç massacre, and from their not having staged the provocations at Ceylanpınar to air raids targeting Qandil. I’m not in a position to say anything at all about that point of view. But, I can say clearly and distinctly that, come what may, after 7 June the sphere of democratic political influence should not have provided the AKP and its entourage with the wherewithal to adopt various stances that questioned the HDP’s position in any way in Turkish society. That is, in terms of who started the conflict and what happened, each party makes its own assessment and comments about this from its own midst. I am not in a position to question a great deal who said what and who turned out to be right about what a great deal. However, I say clearly that we as the HDP took every effort at our disposal to prevent that process of conflict from developing after 7 June. For example, we indicated to government officials as of the first minute that the incident in which two policemen were killed in Ceylanpınar, cited as grounds for ending the solution process, was a blatant provocation and we condemned it.

- Qandil made a statement claiming responsibility, though.

They later stated that it could have been a provocation that wasn’t entirely connected to them and that was undergoing investigation from their own point of view. But, that night, the heaviest air raid of recent years was launched on Qandil. I mean, had it been possible, without such events being experienced, for common-sense positions to be put together over those provocations that ended the solution process, we would probably not be facing such a grave state of affairs today and also the AKP and Erdoğan would not have so much power, especially in terms of the 1 November election results.

- So, you are then saying that the PKK made a mistake there. That’s what I understand.

Come what may, we made it publicly known that democratic politics had greatly expanded its scope to encompass all of Turkey’s politics after 7 June and the thing that would cause the greatest damage to this would be a sequence of events in which conflict broke out. As to whether the state started the conflict, or whether the PKK did so and who contributed in what way, that is not a discussion I propose to greatly embark on. Everybody has an opinion about this. But, I state my opinion that those disputes should not have happened and the sphere of democratic politics should not have been narrowed.

- The Kurdish problem does not at all present a pretty picture. A degree of destruction that makes us long even for the 90’s has taken place. Under what conditions is the solution process possible after this? Broadening the sphere of democratic politics does not much fit in with the AKP’s goals. Is a renewed solution process possible without a huge transformation in politics?

I wish to comment on this by tying it in far more with society’s agenda rather than with the political institution’s agenda. That is, I think that society has been unable to discuss the big picture adequately due to the dizzying developments that are experienced every day and the constantly changing agenda. We are currently facing a very serious political crisis. We are facing a serious social crisis, a serious economic crisis, a huge collapse taking place in foreign policy especially on the Syria and Iraq axis and the government’s daily inconsistencies sometimes before even 24 hours elapse. Turkish society must question what has happened all of a sudden for Turkey to be engulfed in crisis. We have very clearly commented on this as of the first day, but we are confronted with a massive state and media power that does not want to relay this to society. We have stated on countless occasions that, come what may, the solution table must not be overturned and, if the solution table is overturned, serious national and regional crises may be experienced, or continuous coup mechanisms may even come into play. If at the moment we were to trace the reason for all the crises we are experiencing today back to the very beginning, we would for certain have to make a comparison with the outcome had the solution table not been overturned. While the solution table was in play, was there such a severe political crisis? Was there such a severe social and economic crisis? Were such severe problems being experienced with the EU? In the Middle East equation, did Turkey find itself so constrained and occupy positions that were so internally contradictory and even demeaning? Turkish society must take stock of this. The moment society takes stock of this, the moment it turns the prevailing truth about this into a political stance, Erdoğan the AKP will, willy nilly, have to review their current position vis à vis the solution process. The dimension of social demand is important. For example, this is probably our greatest shortcoming as far as the past is concerned. When the solution process was starting, we did not conclude, ‘Erdoğan and the AKP all of a sudden opted for peace and within the space of a week moved abruptly from security policies to peace policies.’ Quite the reverse, I mean even if there were hesitations as to their intentions, we adopted a view that this process would rapidly become rooted in society if it continued and this would also by itself rapidly create a political sphere of legitimacy and, to the extent that it became rooted in society, the solution process would become institutionalised independently of governments’ or political actors’ positions. Perhaps our biggest shortcoming in that period was the inability to root this adequately in society. Perhaps we were unable to politicise it adequately, either. Had we succeeded at the popular level in rooting this in society and politicising it, those who wished to end the solution process would not have had so much latitude to make these kinds of impositions so easily. As such, I can also perhaps make this comment as a form of self-criticism directed at ourselves.

- Nowadays, the solution process has vanished without trace, hasn’t it?

Every crisis situation brings new opportunities with it. This is the very nature of things. If there is a crisis somewhere, discussion as to how the crisis can be exited begins to come to the fore in conjunction with the severe consequences of that crisis. Let us now review the state of affairs we find ourselves in following the ending of the solution process. There are thousands of dead and thousands of young people from both groups have ended up in their graves. There are burnt, destroyed and ruined town centres. There is massive polarisation and ever mounting tension in the whole of society. There is the spectre of an economy that gets more broken by the day. This country has undergone experiences as to how such situations can be surmounted. The agenda conducive to this can be created, too. For this reason, I quite frankly trust Turkish society’s common sense and the level of its debate rather than the political institution.

- Do you still think there exists such a level of debate?

In fact, on 7 June Turkish society gave the following messages. Prior to 7 June there had been a provocation process that had its outset in Ağrı Diyadin and stretched as far as the bombing of the rally two days before the election in Diyarbakır. But, Turkish society demonstrated that it stood by the solution process with the 13% of the vote it gave the HDP, that is, it gave the message through us: ‘We don’t want renewed conflict or tension – we absolutely want to solve this problem through democratic political methods’. However, following that shocking, harshly oppressive environment experienced between 7 June and 1 November, you can actually also see messages to this effect in the 1 November election. This depends on your point of view. With an eye on calm, peace and stability, society’s mind, which on 7 June saw this end served in the resulting political equation from the HDP crossing the threshold, saw the end to this on 1 November being the AKP ruling as a single party. In other words, society’s mind thought, ‘I brought the HDP into parliament but the AKP didn’t accept that and this ushered in a very harsh period. Maybe it needs to rule as a single party to accept this.’

- So, it said, ‘If I bring the AKP to power on its own, this hellish environment will end?’

Yes, it did so with those motives. Even though the AKP came to power as a single party with 49.5% of the vote, not only has it failed to live up to any of the promises it made at that time concerning stability, concerning peace, concerning calm and concerning democracy, it has dragged Turkey into the whirlpool of coups and military putsches and the whirlpool of civilian coups. I think this picture will be seen by Turkish society and this will certainly manifest itself in a powerful political result in the referendum and the AKP will be given a very powerful political message.

- Will victory for ‘No’ amount to such a warning?

I think that Turkish society will, by means of this referendum, severely punish the AKP for not keeping the promises it made after 1 November.

- Could you give your assessment of your meeting with Merkel?

Basic issues such as democracy, human rights and social peace are no longer the preserve of any one country. Within the prevailing global equation, no country can afford to act on its own in these matters. There are international legal norms that restrict and monitor them in some form. There are international institutions. There is a global balance that has been established. There is a regional system. Hence, the picture in Turkey in this regard is currently truly pitiful. There is debate throughout the world today as to whether the rule of law exists in Turkey. Its human rights record has brought it to a position in which it is today the most controversial country in the world. In any case, we speak volumes to the world as to the state of social peace with the calamities that befall us on a daily basis.

- Is the West’s position adequate in your opinion?

In these meetings of ours, I have also stated that the basic criterion must be universal human rights and not national interests in such matters. Just now, there are the co-chairs and members of parliament of a party that obtained six million votes and constitutes the third largest group in parliament in Turkish jails. There are nearly 150 journalists. There are millions on the outside who have fallen victim to state of emergency and decree with the force of law implementations. Hundreds of press and publishing entities have been closed, their doors shut and assets seized. If this has happened, all international actors and institutions that describe themselves with reference to the basic values I have mentioned have responsibility. It is impossible for anybody to remain heedless of this. But in final decisions we keep on seeing that, as certain national interests override basic human values, things are ignored, there are climb downs, serious debate is avoided, it does not turn into serious international pressure and these implementations continue in this form. I have voiced such things not purely in the context of this meeting, but within all of the diplomatic activities we conduct.

- You said, ‘My wife is Turkish’ at the hearing. Why did you feel the need to say this? What is the climate that makes a politician feel the need to make this clear?

They charged me at the hearing with, ‘Overturning the indivisible unity of the state and people.’ I wanted to take this up using an example from my own domestic life. I said that in order to divide the people I would have to divide my own family. I am a Kurd who is a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. My wife is a Turk. I have two children. For me to wish to divide this people, I would have start this task with my own family, and I pointed this out as a means for making the truth visible in an environment in which the attempt is made with so much prejudice to treat the whole of Turkish society and especially HDP supporters as virtual outcasts and virtual lepers.

- Where is your wife from?

My wife is basically from Nevşehir, but was born and grew up in Ankara.

- Do you and your wife differ in the way you view the Kurdish issue and Kurdish politics?

Being Kurdish in this country imposes a very heavy toll. When you are Kurdish, everything you do may run up against the veil of prejudice in some way. You can sense this from the business of renting a flat right up to the work you do in democratic politics. Since my wife has observed this first hand along with me, our views in this regard do not actually clash very much. She argues even more than me that a democratic environment must be achieved in this country in which the diversity living in this country, above all the Kurds, can find free expression. We empathise greatly with one another. She identifies very closely with me in spiritual and conceptual terms over my ordeals. From time to time, she also mentions the shortcomings attributable to us in solving problems through democratic methods, the failure to root these processes in society and the way these processes somehow fall victim to daily political calculations.

- So, are you raising your children as both Turkish and Kurdish?

Actually, neither of us has any such issue. Look, a misrepresentation is always made. It is as though we are Kurdish nationalists. Or there is an attempt to create the idea that we are detached from Turkey’s basic problems and are only interested in the Kurdish problem. None of us deep down has a viewpoint that legitimises or sanctifies a nationalistic world view. We take our reference from humans, individuals. We think that democratic conditions in which the individual can freely express themself must be achieved in this country. If this is prevented for a Kurd, we raise the matter. For whoever this is prevented, for an Armenian, for a Turk, for an Assyrian or for a Syriac, we raise it. People ask you in the street or sometimes in a supermarket, ‘Why do you keep talking about Kurds? Why, apart from the Kurdish problem, do you not talk about our problems?’; I hear such criticisms. They are astonished when I reply to them, ‘I will bring you the statistics about the work we have done in parliament. When you see them, you will see that 30% of our work has to do with the Kurdish issue and 70% to do with Turkey’s basic problems. However, the impression is created the way things are portrayed that we have no interest in absolutely any of Turkey’s problems apart from Kurds’ rights and freedoms.

- The media is responsible for that. The media does not get that across.

We have taken certain steps forward in overcoming this in recent times, but, now that following the 7 June elections the mass media has somehow been made to toe the line, the opposition media has been totally silenced and the circles that express the most varied opinions have somehow been intimidated, this is the kind of environment that has been fostered.