Running with the hare and hunting with the hounds

I see that the media, which a mere two days ago was vilifying America, has fully softened its stance thanks to one phone call.
US President Donal Trump appears to have brought joy to Ankara by saying in the phone call he made to President Tayyip Erdoğan that he would halt arms aid to the YPG in Syria and even, according to pronouncements by Turkish officialdom, going further and saying, “It was nonsense anyhow.”
It is a good thing for Turkish-American relations, which have been progressing extremely lousily, to have softened even by one notch. Especially with hours to go until the Zarrab trial. There is no objection to this. But, I feel the need to impart certain observations regarding current US policy to stem an excessive sense of relief and the entertaining of an expectation that may create fresh disappointment:
1. There is probably no need for me to say that Donald Trump is not the world’s most reliable character. The US President was elected thanks, not to his statesmanship, but his “showman” side. And he is exploiting this with success to mend the US’s fences with the world. His most important attribute is his boundless bonhomie. Until now, with the exception of Angela Merkel, he has made such sycophantic pronouncements as, “the best meeting,” “the best of times,” or “you are our best friend” to all the leaders he has spoken to. As such, there is a need to note this tactic of “making your interlocutor feel good” that is Trump’s speciality.
2. Trump is the US head of state and, of course, sets basic policies, but it is doubtful if he represents all the institutions of state. Both congress and the civil service have the power to rein Trump in.
3. Let there be no misunderstanding: Washington of course attaches importance to Turkey and certainly wants to put things right. Turkey is in an important part of the world and is an important country. But, my observation is that Washington wants to manage its relations with Ankara under a sweet-hard policy and without compromising its own regional policies.
4. The US also wants to keep on good terms with the Kurds. One can call this the policy of “running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.” The Turks and the Kurds, for as long as they fail to resolve the issues between them, will be open to manipulation by the major powers.
5. What Trump has said amounts to a statement of the already known. With the completion of the Raqqa operation, the Pentagon no longer needs to provide fresh munitions to the YPG and Syrian Democratic Forces, of which the YPG is part. However, it would be wrong to interpret this as the US “washing its hands of the Kurds.” There are more than two thousand US troops and 7-8 miniscule bases there. As far as I know, the US has no plan to abruptly withdraw from the north of Syria. The statement, “We will not give fresh arms” is not tantamount to saying that the alliance with the SDF is over.
6. My guess and intuition is that the US is planning to stay in Raqqa and the other Kurdish regions for at least a further year. To be involved in the process of “stabilisation”, i.e. setting up a pluralistic and Arab-Kurdish mixed political system and constructing electricity and water infrastructure in the ensuing stage. The Pentagon only contemplates leaving after that.
7. Washington has absolutely no commitment to the Kurds. It says, “The kind of government that will exist here in the end will emerge as a result of the negotiations you conduct with the Damascus regime.” However, both the US and Russia think that the Syrian Kurds will no longer live as before and need to have some kind of autonomy, even if loose.
8. This is also a guess: For as long as the Trump administration is hung up about Iran and Iran’s expansionary policies, it will not break off its relations with the Syrian Kurds. I was in Washington a few weeks ago and the formulation I heard most was “Iran’s bridge to the Mediterranean.” They are terrified of this. As things stand, however much Trump would be only too delighted to hand over the Syrian issue to Russia, he does not want to give Iran extra space in doing so. In short, they will not want the Kurdish regions of Syria to fall in their entirety into the sphere of influence of the Assad regime and, as such, of Iran.
9. And the final word: The Syrian Kurds will, sooner or later, have to embark on “normalisation” with Ankara, as will Ankara, sooner or later, with the Syrian Kurds. There is a bumpy road until 2019. However, it will not be surprising if the normalisation stage is then entered. Historic and geographical interests on both sides dictate this.